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According to attribution models of familiarity assessment, people can use a heuristic in
recognition-memory decisions, in which they attribute the subjective ease of processing
of a memory probe to a prior encounter with the stimulus in question. Research in social
cognition suggests that experienced positive affect may be the proximal cue that signals
fluency in various experimental contexts. In the present study, we compared the effects
of positive affect and fluency on recognition-memory judgments for faces with neutral
emotional expression. We predicted that if positive affect is indeed the critical cue that
signals processing fluency at retrieval, then its manipulation should produce effects that
closely mirror those produced by manipulations of processing fluency. In two experiments,
we employed a masked-priming procedure in combination with a Remember-Know (RK)
paradigm that aimed to separate familiarity- from recollection-based memory decisions.
In addition, participants performed a prime-discrimination task that allowed us to take
inter-individual differences in prime awareness into account. We found highly similar
effects of our priming manipulations of processing fluency and of positive affect. In both
cases, the critical effect was specific to familiarity-based recognition responses. Moreover,
in both experiments it was reflected in a shift toward a more liberal response bias, rather
than in changed discrimination. Finally, in both experiments, the effect was found to
be related to prime awareness; it was present only in participants who reported a lack
of such awareness on the prime-discrimination task. These findings add to a growing
body of evidence that points not only to a role of fluency, but also of positive affect in
familiarity assessment. As such they are consistent with the idea that fluency itself may
be hedonically marked.
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INTRODUCTION
Most people can relate to experiencing an immediate and com-
pelling sense of familiarity toward an individual, despite being
unable to recall a specific past encounter with that person. This
familiarity experience was illustrated by Mandler in his clas-
sic butcher-on-the-bus scenario: One may encounter the town
butcher in an unusual context, i.e., on the bus, and be left with
an impression of familiarity in the absence of successful recovery
of any episodic context of a prior meeting (Mandler, 1980). This
sense of familiarity can be contrasted with a recollective recog-
nition experience, in which contextual details of a specific past
encounter can be recovered. In dual-process models of recog-
nition memory, these two recognition experiences have been
linked to two distinct retrieval processes, i.e., familiarity assess-
ment and recollection (see Yonelinas, 2002, for review). In the
current paper, we aim to shed light on the cognitive mechanisms
that underlie familiarity-based recognition memory decisions for
faces, with a particular focus on the role of fluency and positive
affect.
Dating back to research in the early 1980s, there have been
suggestions in the literature that impressions of familiarity may
not necessarily be the result of direct access to a pertinent stored
representation, but can be based on other, more indirect sources.
One such source that has undergone considerable investigation
in cognitive research on recognition memory is processing flu-
ency (Jacoby and Dallas, 1981; Jacoby, 1983; Whittlesea et al.,
1990; Whittlesea, 1993). Fluency refers to the subjective ease with
which a stimulus is being processed, and has been shown to
influence many types of cognitive phenomena, including per-
ceptual coherence, intuition, and recognition-memory decisions
(e.g., Rajaram, 1993; Kinoshita, 1997; Brown and Marsh, 2009;
Topolinski and Strack, 2009, 2010; Verde et al., 2010). In perhaps
the best-known illustration of this effect in the memory litera-
ture, manipulations that increase the processing fluency of the
recognition-memory cue have been found to generate increased
feelings of familiarity for this cue (e.g., Jacoby and Whitehouse,
1989;Whittlesea, 1993; Topolinski, 2012). Jacoby andWhitehouse
(1989) manipulated the processing fluency of words in a stan-
dard recognition memory paradigm by briefly presenting either
the same or a different word prior to the test word (e.g., dog–dog,
house-dog). The duration of the prime words was manipulated
such that they appeared either for 50 or 200ms. The matching as
compared to non-matching prime words were found to increase
participants’ tendency to call words “old,” which occurred for
truly old words and even when they were novel lures that had
not been encountered in the study phase. Critically, however, this
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effect was observed only when the prime word was presented for
50ms and participants reported that they had been unaware of
its presence. Other evidence for fluency-related effects on recog-
nition memory comes from research, for example, in which the
blocking of oral movements, by way of chewing gum, specifi-
cally impaired familiarity but not recollection-based recognition
of words (Topolinski, 2012).
According to attribution models of familiarity, the influence of
fluency on familiarity-based memory decisions reflects the oper-
ation of a heuristic in which people attribute the subjective ease
of processing to a prior encounter with the stimulus in question,
in particular when they cannot explain that fluency in other ways
(Jacoby and Dallas, 1981; Jacoby, 1983; Whittlesea et al., 1990;
Whittlesea, 1993). Evidence in support of the idea that this mech-
anism plays a role that is specific to familiarity comes from a
study by Rajaram (1993) who employed a variant of the Jacoby–
Whitehouse paradigm in combination with the Remember-Know
(RK) procedure (Tulving, 1985). In this procedure, participants
are asked to introspect as to whether recognition of prior occur-
rence was accompanied by the recovery of pertinent episodic con-
textual detail in the study phase (“remember”), or whether it was
lacking any such detail (“know”). As in Jacoby and Whitehouse’s
(1989) original study, participants were more likely to endorse
test items primed by a matching word as “old.” Critically, this
response pattern was observed only for recognition judgments
accompanied by a “Know” response, suggesting a specific role
of fluency in familiarity-based memory decisions. Although this
basic finding has been replicated a number of times, some evi-
dence suggests that this process specificity may only be observed
when familiarity and recollection are probed with the binary RK-
procedure, but not when probed with two separate quantitative
ratings (Higham and Vokey, 2004; Kurilla andWestermann, 2008;
Brown and Bodner, 2011).
While memory researchers have focused on the consequence
of prior occurrence on recognition-memory judgments, there
is also a wealth of studies indicating that the exposure of a
stimulus can have affective consequences. Specifically, repeated
exposure to various types of stimuli has been reported to increase
positive affect toward those stimuli (Zajonc, 1968; Bornstein,
1989; Harmon-Jones and Allen, 2001;Winkielman and Cacioppo,
2001), an observation termed the mere exposure effect. For exam-
ple, prior encounters with a person have been shown to increase
positive attitudes (i.e., likeability) and boost perceived attractive-
ness toward this individual (Moreland and Beach, 1992). Other
evidence suggests that influences between prior exposure and
positive affect are bi-directional. Monin (2003) found that partic-
ipants were more likely to judge attractive faces as familiar com-
pared to faces of average attractiveness. Furthermore, familiarity
for moderately attractive faces was enhanced when participants
had previously made similar judgments on a set of less attrac-
tive faces; the sequential contrast presumably led to an increase in
perceived attractiveness for the moderately attractive faces, and in
turn enhanced feelings of familiarity through the corresponding
increase in positive affect (Garcia-Marques et al., 2004; see also
Claypool et al., 2008). Other evidence in support of the notion
that positive affect can influence recognition judgments comes
from research in which participants were asked to generate facial
expressions and postures that were consistent either with positive
or negative affect, while making recognition memory judgments
(Phaf and Rotteveele, 2005; Verde et al., 2010). In one such study,
participants in a happy-expression condition judged words with
higher confidence as old than participants in a sad-expression
condition, leading to a significantly more lenient response bias
as revealed in Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC)-based
analyses derived from signal-detection theory (Verde et al., 2010).
The authors suggested that this shift in response bias may in
fact reflect the strongest type of support for an attributional
account of familiarity, as it points to an influence that is, by
definition, independent of mnemonic evidence. However, while
this and the previously reviewed findings provide evidence that
positive affect influences recognition-memory judgments, it is
currently not clear whether the influence applies to familiarity
assessment as conceptualized and measured in models of recog-
nition memory, which distinguish this process from recollection
(Yonelinas, 2001). As a consequence, it also remains unknown
whether positive affect shows the same specificity in its influence
on recognition-memory judgments as fluency.
A proposal that deserves specific consideration in this context
is the notion that positive affect and fluencymay be directly linked
in their influence on recognition decisions and in other cogni-
tive domains (e.g., stimulus coherence, Topolinski and Strack,
2009); some have in fact argued that processing fluency in itself
is hedonically marked (Reber et al., 1998; Harmon-Jones and
Allen, 2001; Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001; Zajonc, 2001;
Winkielman et al., 2003). Zajonc (2001) suggested that familiar
objects or familiar people are less likely to be dangerous than their
unfamiliar counterparts; the positive affective marking of fluency
could rapidly signal this safety even in the absence of any detailed
analysis of the present situation (see Song and Schwarz, 2009,
for related ideas). Some of the strongest support for a direct link
between fluency and positive affect comes from psychophysiolog-
ical research, showing that perceptual priming of visual stimuli
not only leads to an increase in subjective liking, but also to
the immediate expression of a smile response as measured with
electromyographic recordings (Harmon-Jones and Allen, 2001;
Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001).
Recall that processing fluency has been demonstrated to influ-
ence familiarity selectively when the latter is probed with binary
RK judgments in a recognition-memory task (Rajaram, 1993;
Kurilla and Westermann, 2008; Brown and Bodner, 2011). If
positive affect is indeed the critical cue that signals processing flu-
ency in familiarity assessment, then it can be predicted that the
effects of positive affect shouldmirror those produced by process-
ing fluency in familiarity-based recognition-memory decisions.
In the two experiments reported here, we examined this issue
using variants of the priming procedure introduced by Jacoby
and Whitehouse (1989). In Experiment 1, we show that the clas-
sic effect of processing fluency on recognition memory extends to
face stimuli; we report that the masked presentation of a face with
the same identity as a subsequent memory probe leads to a liberal
shift in response bias in familiarity-based memory decisions; in
line with Jacoby and Whitehouse’s original findings, this effect is
dependent on lack of awareness of the priming manipulation. In
Experiment 2, we manipulated affect by introducing primes that
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were always of a different identity than the subsequent memory
probes, but that carried a positive or neutral facial expression;
we show that priming with a happy expression produces the
same pattern of effects on recognition-memory decisions as the
manipulation of fluency in Experiment 1.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHODS
Participants
Forty-one participants participated in the study (25 females;
Age M = 22.3, SD = 2.9). All participants gave their written
informed consent before participation. One participant was
excluded from analyses due to an excessively high level of prime
awareness in the third phase of the experiment (discrimina-
tion >2 SDs above Mean). Another participant was excluded
due to an endorsement of less than three “Remember” responses
overall, which did not allow us to confirm that the participant
understood the RK distinction. All participants were compen-
sated financially, or received course credit, for their participation.
The study protocol was approved by a Research Ethics Board at
the University of Western Ontario.
Stimuli
The stimuli presented were colored images of faces taken from
the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (KDEF) as
well as the NimStim Emotional Face Stimuli database (Lundqvist
et al., 1998; Tottenham et al., 2009). All faces were cropped down
to a specific oval template, including the forehead, eyes, nose,
mouth, and full jaw, while leaving out hair, jewelry, and ears.
This was done to create a more homogenous sample of faces
and to reduce large variations in hair style and other stylis-
tic qualities across databases. All face stimuli were surrounded
by a rectangular background of Gaussian noise. Overall, 152
neutral faces were used, split into 8 unique sets with 19 faces
per set.
Different sets of faces were used as targets (old test items) and
novel lures. For each set of old and new items, 3 priming con-
ditions were introduced that corresponded to, (i) Match primes,
(ii) Mismatch primes, and (iii) Scrambled primes consisting of
ovals with no discernible identity (i.e., a scrambled face oval
placed where a face prime would usually be). Having three prime
types for both old and new items resulted in a 2 (test status: Old
or New) × 3 (prime condition: Match, Mismatch, Scrambled)
within-subjects experimental design. Six of the eight sets of 19
faces were used as target faces because both old and new items
had three prime types as stated above. One set of 19 faces had to
be used as novel non-identity primes for old items, and the final
set of 19 unique faces consisted of the novel non-identity primes
for the new test items. A complete 8-list counterbalance scheme
was created with this grouping, having each set of 19 faces once in
all 8 positions.
For the forced-choice prime discrimination task, a pseudo ran-
dom sample of 20Mismatch-primed items (half target and lures),
and 20 Match-primed items (half targets and lures) were selected.
These items were randomized to create the task list. All 8 counter-
balancing versions of the experiment had a unique, list-specific,
arrangement of items for the discrimination task.
Procedure
Figure 1 illustrates the experimental procedure and event
sequence used in Experiment 1. Images were presented on a
CRT monitor with E-Prime 1.0 (Psychology Software Tools).
Participants viewed images at a distance of 50 cm. Faces and their
background frames subtended approximately 17◦ of visual angle.
Prior to the initial study phase, participants were informed that
they would be required to make judgments about faces, followed
by a memory test. At study, participants were asked to make like-
ability judgments. A fixation cross appeared for 1000ms prior to
each face, which was then presented for 1500ms. Immediately
after the face disappeared, participants were instructed to judge
how much they liked that face using a 6 point scale, with 1 corre-
sponding to “strongly dislike,” and 6 corresponding to “strongly
like.” This judgment of likeability was intended to encourage par-
ticipants to attend to each face during study. After each rating was
made, there was a 1000ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI) prior to
the next face presentation. The faces designated to each prime
condition were randomized.
After the completion of the study phase, participants received
instructions for the recognition test. Overall, test instructions
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of event sequences and trial types for each
experiment.
www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 328 | 3
Duke et al. Positive affect, fluency, and familiarity
spanned roughly 5min. Participants were informed that they
would then undergo a recognition memory test for the faces pre-
sented during the study phase. They were informed that half of
the faces in the upcoming test were faces seen during the study
phase, and the other half were new faces (i.e., not previously
encountered), and also, that the order was random.
At test, each face was preceded by a fixation cross for 1000ms,
immediately followed by a scrambled face oval for 500ms, serv-
ing as the forward mask, which was followed by the prime face.
The prime was presented for 33ms, followed by a 33ms back-
ward mask, which consisted of the same scrambled face used
as the forward mask. Finally, the probe face was presented for
1500ms (see Figure 1 for schematic representation of trial struc-
ture). Participants were not informed about the presence of the
prime face, and reported only seeing one continuous scrambled
oval prior to each target face. When the probe face disappeared,
participants were prompted with “Old” or “New” cues, and
were given 3000ms to make their memory decision. If partic-
ipants claimed that they recognized the face as “old,” an RK
judgment was required in a self-paced manner. Participants indi-
cated whether the experience of recognition was characterized
merely by a sense of familiarity for the face in question, or by
recollection of episodic detail concerning the initial encounter.
Instructions for RK judgments were modeled after those provided
by Rajaram (1993). It was emphasized that a single contextual
detail would be sufficient to warrant a “Remember” response. To
ensure that participants completely understood the phenomeno-
logical distinction between familiarity and recollection, they were
told to verbally justify their choice for their first two “Remember”
and “Know” responses to the experimenter. If the justifications
suggested that the distinction was not properly employed, par-
ticipants obtained feedback with a reiteration of the critical
instructions from the experimenter.
After the recognition-memory test, participants were fully
debriefed concerning the nature of the priming manipulation
during the memory experiment. A prime discrimination task was
then administered, which required participants to judge whether
the purportedly subliminal prime stimulus matched or mis-
matched the identity of the probe face. As the primary contrast
of interest concerned matching vs. mismatching identity primes,
we considered discrimination accuracy in this task as an objec-
tive measure of prime awareness. Participants were told that half
of the faces were primed by the same face as the probe, and the
other half by novel faces. All image presentation parameters were
the same as for the recognition memory test. After the probe face
disappeared in any given trial, participants were prompted with
the text, “Was the prime identity the same as the probe identity?”
and were required to provide a “yes” or “no” response.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Recognition memory in entire sample
A One-Way, repeated measures ANOVA 1 revealed that overall
recognition performance (i.e., discrimination between old and
new test faces), as reflected in d′ scores, was not significantly
affected by the priming manipulations [F(2, 76) = 0.393, p =
0.642; see Table 1]. Similarly, the accuracy of “Remember”
responses was also unaffected by priming [F(2, 76) = 0.359, p =
0.644]. To examine the influence of the priming manipulation
on familiarity in a model that assumes independence between
both processes, we first applied the correction procedure intro-
duced by Yonelinas (1999, 2002). Using the correction, we found
that familiarity-based discrimination (d′) did not differ between
prime conditions [F(2, 76) = 0.142, p = 0.823]. We next exam-
ined whether there was an effect on the general bias to endorse
faces as “old” when memory decisions were familiarity-based.
A measure of response bias (C-criterion placement; Macmillan
and Creelman, 2005) based on the corrected “Know” responses
revealed no shift in response bias [F(2, 76) = 0.845, p = 0.428].
When we conducted these statistical tests on familiarity-based
measures within a model in which no assumption about inde-
pendence is made (i.e., when no correction is applied), the same
pattern of results emerged; there was no evidence for an effect of
our experimental fluency manipulation (all p > 0.05).
Recognition memory in relation to prime awareness
Critically, in a number of prior investigations, fluency effects
have only been shown to be present when the manipula-
tion was reported to be subliminal (Jacoby and Whitehouse,
1989; Goldinger and Hansen, 2005; Phaf and Rotteveele, 2005).
Therefore, we next examined whether an effect of our fluency
manipulation could be revealed if inter-individual differences in
prime awareness were taken into account. We estimated prime
awareness based on discrimination performance in phase 3 of the
1Degrees of freedom were adjusted for violations of sphericity using
Greenhouse–Geisser epsilon multipliers.
Table 1 | Recognition accuracy, familiarity, recollection, and criterion placement for participants with high or low level of prime awareness.
Condition-Group d ′ Recognition d ′ Familiarity Recollection C “Remember” C Familiarity
Match-Low 0.74(0.06) 0.62(0.08) 0.13(0.02) 1.49(0.08) 0.53(0.04)
Mismatch-Low 0.75(0.11) 0.60(0.12) 0.13(0.02) 1.38(0.09) 0.70(0.07)
Scramble-Low 0.74(0.12) 0.62(0.11) 0.13(0.03) 1.38(0.09) 0.66(0.05)
Match-High 0.93(0.09) 0.77(0.13) 0.18(0.01) 1.30(0.07) 0.76(0.06)
Mismatch-High 0.97(0.12) 0.83(0.15) 0.17(0.01) 1.32(0.08) 0.73(0.06)
Scramble-High 0.79(0.09) 0.68(0.08) 0.15(0.01) 1.36(0.06) 0.60(0.05)
High and Low prime awareness groups defined by cut-off at d ′ 0.19 prime awareness in the last phase of experiment. “Recollection” refers to “Remember”
hits-false alarm rate. SEM in parentheses.
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experiment. We examined the relationship between the effects of
our priming manipulation and prime awareness based on corre-
lational analyses conducted in the entire sample of participants.
When we calculated the difference score in criterion placement
C for corrected familiarity-based responses for the Match as
compared to Mismatch priming conditions, we observed no sig-
nificant relationship to prime awareness scores [r(37) = −0.23,
p = 0.17]. However, a corresponding analysis that employed
the other baseline condition, i.e., the presentation of scrambled
faces, did reveal a significant relationship; specifically, it revealed
a significant negative correlation between the difference scores
in criterion placement for corrected familiarity-based responses
and prime awareness in phase 3 [r(37) = −0.34, p < 0.05; see
Figure 2]. This negative correlation indicates that those partici-
pants who were less aware of the priming manipulation tended to
exhibit a shift toward a more liberal response bias for familiarity-
based decisions in the experimental condition that aimed to
increase processing fluency. Inasmuch as any two faces have a high
degree of perceptual overlap, the presentation of scrambled faces
is arguably themore appropriate baseline condition in the current
experiment to reveal effects of perceptual fluency. We note that
the negative correlation between response bias for familiarity-
based memory decisions and prime awareness also emerged when
criterion placement was calculated without correction, i.e., within
a model that does not assume independence between familiarity
and recollection [r(37) = −0.33, p < 0.05]. By contrast, an exam-
ination of response bias C for recollection-based “Remember”
responses did not reveal any relationship between any effects
of the priming manipulation and prime awareness [r(37) =
0.16, p = 0.340], in line with the negative findings obtained in
FIGURE 2 | Relationship between prime awareness (d ′), as measured
in prime-discrimination task, and difference in criterion location (C)
between Match and Scramble trials for “Know” responses in
recognition decisions in Experiment 1. Positive priming values reflect a
more liberal criterion placement for Match relative to Scramble prime
condition. Dots represent data of individual participants.
the analysis that was restricted to participants with low prime
awareness.
We also conducted similar analyses restricted to a subsample
of participants who clearly showed no evidence for prime aware-
ness in phase 3. All planned comparisons are two-tailed unless
otherwise noted. Overall, participants’ d′ scores were signifi-
cantly above chance as measured by a one-sample t-test against
0 [t(38) = 3.145, p < 0.01], suggesting that for the sample as a
whole priming could not be assumed to be subliminal. While
the average d′ score in the prime-discrimination task was 0.19
(SD = 0.37), there were considerable inter-individual differences
that were reflected in a range of scores between −0.60 and 0.78.
These inter-individual differences allowed us to examine whether
our fluency manipulation had any effect on recognition decisions
that was dependent on absence of prime awareness. Using the
Mean of d′ in the prime-discrimination task (M = 0.19) as the
cut off score, we identified a subsample of participants (n = 17) in
whom prime discriminability was clearly not above chance level,
as confirmed statistically with a one-sample t-test against 0 [in
fact, performance was statistically below chance level in this sam-
ple; t(16) = 3.095, p < 0.01]. To determine whether the priming
manipulation had the predicted effect on response bias in this
subsample, we examined a planned contrast on C-values for cor-
rected familiarity responses between the Match relative to both
theMismatch and Scramble priming conditions; this test revealed
a more liberal response bias for familiarity-based memory deci-
sions in the Match condition as predicted [F(1, 16) = 4.916, p <
0.05 (one-tailed)]. The effect was also present when we calculated
response bias with uncorrected familiarity scores [F(1, 16) = 7.09,
p < 0.05]. Critically, we observed no differences in familiarity-
based discrimination (d′) across priming conditions regardless
of whether it was calculated with or without the independence
assumption (p’s > 0.8). Also, a corresponding test on response
bias (C) for recollection-based responses did not reveal any effect
of priming [F(1, 16) = 0.766, p = 0.394].
Finally, a comparison of the correlation between prime aware-
ness and the effects of priming on the different memory-
performance measures revealed a significantly larger correlation
for C familiarity than d′ familiarity [t(36) = 1.695, p < 0.05
(one-tailed)] and recollection [t(36) = 2.239, p < 0.05], using
Hotelling’s t-test, further highlighting the specificity of the prim-
ing effect.
Overall, Experiment 1 demonstrated that primes that matched
the identity of the subsequent target faces selectively boosted their
perceived familiarity; this effect was only observed in partici-
pants who were unaware of the presence of the prime stimuli.
These results show that the classic fluency effect first described
by Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) for verbal stimuli extends to
recognition-memory for faces. Critically, they also show that the
effect operates with the same specificity on binary RK judg-
ments as described in past research with verbal stimuli (Rajaram,
1993; Higham and Vokey, 2004; Kurilla and Westermann, 2008;
Brown and Bodner, 2011). In Experiment 2, we sought to build
on the findings of Experiment 1 and examine the role of pos-
itive affect. Given the proposed link between fluency, positive
affect, and feelings of familiarity (Harmon-Jones and Allen, 2001;
Monin, 2003; Garcia-Marques et al., 2004; Phaf and Rotteveele,
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2005), we asked whether a priming-based manipulation of pos-
itive affect would produce the same effect on familiarity-based
memory decisions as the manipulation of fluency in Experiment
1, and whether any such effect would also show the same rela-
tionship to prime awareness. We again focused on recognition
memory for faces and employed a priming procedure similar
to that in Experiment 1, with the exception that the prime
stimuli consisted of happy (i.e., smiling) faces conveying pos-
itive affect, or neutral faces as a control condition. To control
for any fluency effects based on perceptual overlap between
primes and targets across experimental conditions, the faces
employed as primes were always of a different identity than
the faces subsequently presented for memory judgments. We
expected that the presentation of happy as compared to neu-
tral face primes would result in a shift toward a more liberal
response bias for familiarity-based memory decisions, specifi-
cally in those participants who were unaware of the priming
manipulation.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHODS
Participants
Seventy-two individuals who gave written informed consent par-
ticipated in the study for compensation (Age M = 21.1, SD =
2.5, 45 females). Data from five participants were excluded from
analyses due to exceptionally high prime awareness (discrimi-
nation scores > two SD above Mean; see Hannula et al., 2005,
for rationale). Data from seven participants were excluded from
analyses given that they had chance recognition performance or
did not provide at least three “Remember” responses.
Stimuli
The images of faces used in this experiment were prepared in an
identical manner as those in Experiment 1 (i.e., cropped face and
noise frame). Additional faces from the Radboud Face Database
were included in the set so as to increase the numbers of items
available as primes with expression of positive or neutral affect
(Langner et al., 2010). The final set consisted of 144 face iden-
tities; for each identity there was a version with a happy and a
neutral facial expression. The entire set was divided into four
lists, with two lists serving as targets and two lists serving as
lures in the recognition-memory test. Old and new test items
were primed by either a happy (list 1) or a neutral face (list 2),
leading to a 2 (test status: Old or New) × 2 (prime condition:
Happy, Neutral) experimental design. Assignment of lists to con-
ditions was counterbalanced across participants. All face probes
presented for memory judgments were shown with neutral facial
expression. Each probe face was paired with a prime of a differ-
ent identity to avoid any influence of identity-based priming (i.e.,
as manipulated in Experiment 1). Each identity was used only
once as prime (i.e., primes were trial unique). However, given
the limited set of 144 identities available for the entire experi-
ment, each prime had the same identity as one of the faces used
as memory probes on other trials in the same experimental con-
dition. Critically, identities presented as primes appeared equally
often before and after their use as probes across experimental
conditions.
Procedure
The procedure for the study phase was identical to Experiment
1, except that faces were presented at a duration of 500ms
rather than 1500ms. After a 5-min delay, participants performed
the recognition-memory test. The procedure and presentation
parameters for this test were the same as in Experiment 1, includ-
ing facial primes being presented for 33ms, except for a difference
in the duration of the presentation of probe faces; faces that were
to be judged as “old” or “new” were presented for 250ms rather
than 1500ms. After the recognition-memory test, participants
were probed for prime awareness and were fully debriefed con-
cerning the nature of the priming manipulation in the memory
experiment. Subsequently, they were probed for prime awareness
with a task that had the same structure as the memory test but
required participants to judge whether the purportedly sublimi-
nal prime on every trial had a happy or a neutral facial expression.
Participants were told that half of the probes were primed by
happy faces, and the other half by neutral faces. Stimuli and
all image presentation parameters were the same as used in the
recognition-memory test. Participants were required to indicate
the perceived expression with a button press.
RESULTS
Recognition memory in entire sample
A paired t-test showed that overall recognition performance,
as reflected in d′ scores, was not significantly affected by the
priming manipulation [t(59) = 1.220, p = 0.227]. Similarly, the
accuracy of “Remember” responses was unaffected by this manip-
ulation [t(59) = 0.771, p = 0.444]. An examination of familiarity-
based discrimination, calculated as d′ based on corrected “Know”
responses or as d′-based on uncorrected “Know” responses, did
not reveal any differences between the priming conditions [t(59) =
1.063, p = 0.292; t(59) = 1.03, p = 0.307]. Finally, there was also
no difference in response bias for familiarity-based responses
across experimental conditions, regardless of whether C was cal-
culated with [t(59) = 0.720, p = 0.474] or without [t(59) = 0.773,
p = 0.443] correction for independence.
Recognition memory in relation to prime awareness
As in Experiment 1, we next examined whether an effect of our
experimental manipulation could be revealed if inter-individual
differences in prime awareness, as measured in the prime discrim-
ination task of the experiment, were taken into account. Prime
awareness scores were on average above 0 (Mean d′ = 0.32, SD =
0.53) and ranged between −0.38 and 1.77; a one-sample t-test
confirmed that values were significantly above chance [t(59) =
4.665, p < 0.0001], suggesting that prime awareness could not
be assumed to be subliminal in the entire sample. To deter-
mine whether there was any effect of our priming manipulation
on response bias in familiarity-based memory decisions that
might depend on levels of prime awareness, we again calculated
a difference score for C across the two priming conditions in
each participant and examined the relationship between these
scores and scores of prime awareness, as reflected in d′ of the
prime discrimination task. Here, a significant negative correlation
emerged, regardless of whether C was calculated within a model
that assumed independence between familiarity and recollection
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[r(58) = −0.285, p < 0.05; see Figure 3], or within a model that
did not assume independence [r(58) = −0.25, p < 0.05, one-
tailed]. Mirroring the pattern we observed in Experiment 1, as
prime awareness decreased, there was a shift toward a more
liberal response bias in familiarity-based decisions for stimuli
primed with happy as compared to neutral faces. In other words,
to the extent that participants had low awareness of the prim-
ing manipulation, the presentation of positive, affective primes
increased the likelihood that they would endorse any probe face
as familiar. Critically, we observed no corresponding relation-
ship to familiarity-based discrimination, regardless of whether
the latter was calculated with or without correction for inde-
pendence [r(58) = −0.05, p = 0.683; r(58) = −0.05, p = 0.702].
Also, this effect was specific to familiarity-based decisions as we
did not observe any significant relationship when we focused
on the response bias for “Remember” responses [r(58) = −0.08,
p = 0.564].
As in Experiment1, we also conducted similar analyses
restricted to a subsample of participants who clearly showed no
evidence for prime awareness in phase 3. A cut-off at the Mean
of prime-discrimination (d′ = 0.32) allowed us to select such a
group of participants (n = 37) who did not show above chance
levels of prime awareness, as confirmed with a one-sample t-
test of the d′ discrimination scores against a population mean
of 0 [t(36) = 0.238, p = 0.813]. As predicted, memory judgments
on items that were primed with happy faces were characterized
by a significantly more liberal response bias in familiarity-based
decisions; this was the case when the independence correction
was applied [t(36) = 1.746, p < 0.05 (one-tailed)], and a sig-
nificant trend emerged when uncorrected [t(36) = 1.671, p <
FIGURE 3 | Relationship between prime awareness (d ′), as measured
in prime-discrimination task, and difference in criterion location (C)
between Happy and Neutral trials for “Know” responses in
recognition decisions in Experiment 2. Positive priming values reflect a
more liberal criterion placement for Happy relative to Neutral prime
condition. Dots represent data of individual participants.
0.0515 (one-tailed)]. By contrast, there were no differences in
familiarity-based discrimination (d′) (all p> 0.64 with or without
correction for independence; see Table 2). Also, there was no shift
in bias for “Remember” responses [t(36) = 0.380, p = 0.706],
highlighting again the specificity of the effect for familiarity that
we observed.
Furthermore, to highlight the specificity of the observed prim-
ing effect, we also conducted a 2(prime type) × 2(awareness
group) group factorial MANOVA incorporating C familiarity, d′
familiarity, and recollection estimates, which revealed a signif-
icant prime × group interaction [F(3, 56) = 3.345, p < 0.025].
Three univariate tests were employed to examine this effect on
C familiarity, d′ familiarity, and recollection estimates individu-
ally. They revealed a significant prime × group interaction for C
familiarity [F(1, 58) = 5.911, p < 0.018], with no other significant
effects.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present experiments aimed to compare the effects of per-
ceptual fluency and positive affect on familiarity assessment for
faces with neutral expressions. Using variants of the Jacoby–
Whitehouse paradigm in combination with the RK procedure,
we found that the manipulation of positive affect in Experiment
2 produced a pattern of results that closely mirrored the one
produced by the classic manipulation of processing fluency in
Experiment 1. In both experiments, the critical effect was specific
to familiarity-based responses. Moreover, in both experiments it
was reflected in a shift toward a more liberal response bias, rather
than in changed discrimination. Finally, in both experiments, the
effect was found to be related to prime awareness; it was present
only in participants who reported a lack of such awareness on a
separate prime-discrimination task. These findings add to a grow-
ing body of evidence that points not only to a role of fluency,
but also of positive affect in familiarity assessment. As such they
are consistent with the idea that fluency itself may be hedonically
marked.
PERCEPTUAL FLUENCY AND ENHANCED FACE FAMILIARITY
Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Jacoby–Whitehouse effect
can be observed in recognition memory decisions for faces, and
is reflected in a more liberal response bias in familiarity-based
recognition decisions for such stimuli. To our knowledge, this
effect has previously not been demonstrated with faces. At the
same time, these results extend an existing literature on the role
of perceptual fluency in memory judgments for faces with other
types of fluency manipulations. For example, in prior studies it
has been demonstrated that an enhancement of the perceptual
clarity of test faces increases participants’ tendency to judge them
as “old” (Whittlesea et al., 1990; Kleider and Goldinger, 2004).
Using the RK procedure, we observed that such a shift in response
bias, at least within the Jacoby–Whitehouse paradigm, is specific
to familiarity as defined by dual-process models of recognition
memory (Yonelinas, 2001). Past studies investigating the role of
fluency in face recognition have not explicitly examined the influ-
ence on both processes, sometimes simply assuming that familiar-
ity was specifically affected in the critical memory decisions (e.g.,
Monin, 2003). However, this is not a trivial point; recent studies
www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 328 | 7
Duke et al. Positive affect, fluency, and familiarity
Table 2 | Recognition accuracy, familiarity, recollection, and criterion placement for participants with high or low level of prime awareness.
Condition-Group d ′ Recognition d ′ Familiarity Recollection C “Remember” C Familiarity
Happy-Low 0.45(0.03) 0.34(0.04) 0.08(0.01) 1.25(0.04) 0.54(0.03)
Neutral-Low 0.43(0.03) 0.31(0.04) 0.10(0.01) 1.22(0.04) 0.64(0.03)
Happy-High 0.58(0.04) 0.43(0.05) 0.11(0.01) 1.13(0.03) 0.54(0.03)
Neutral-High 0.46(0.04) 0.30(0.05) 0.11(0.01) 1.04(0.03) 0.46(0.03)
High and Low prime awareness groups defined by cut-off at d ′ 0.32 prime awareness in the last phase of experiment. “Recollection” refers to “Remember”
hits-false alarm rate. SEM in parentheses.
have shown that, under some circumstances, fluency manipula-
tions can also influence recollection. Evidence from a number
of studies, with stimuli other than faces, suggests that selective
effects of fluency on familiarity may only be observed when famil-
iarity and recollection are probed with the binary RK-procedure,
but not when probed with two separate quantitative ratings
(Higham and Vokey, 2004; Kurilla andWestermann, 2008; Brown
and Bodner, 2011). While measurement issues remain a topic of
active research and strong disagreement in the dual-process liter-
ature (e.g., Dunn, 2008;Wixted andMickes, 2010; Yonelinas et al.,
2010; Migo et al., 2012) it should be noted that even when both
processes have been probed with two separate ratings, the clas-
sic Jacoby–Whitehouse effect has consistently been observed for
familiarity-based responses. One challenge in such experiments is
that participantsmay find it difficult, if not impossible, to separate
both memory dimensions. In an experiment in which a specific
effort was made to minimize contamination of memory judg-
ments across the two types of ratings (by obtaining them in two
independent samples of participants), it was found that the effect
was still larger for familiarity than for recollection (Brown and
Bodner, 2011).
Another issue to consider when evaluating the process-
specificity of fluency effects is thatmultiple sources of fluencymay
contribute to familiarity. In research with verbal stimuli that have
semantic meaning, it has long been recognized that familiarity
may not only be linked to the fluency of perceptual processing but
also of conceptual processing (see Dew and Cabeza, 2011 and Voss
et al., 2012, for reviews). For example, masked priming effects
on recognition-memory decisions have also been found with
primes that were conceptually related, rather than identical, to the
subsequent memory probes (Rajaram and Geraci, 2000; Taylor
and Henson, 2012; Dew and Cabeza, 2013). Such conceptually-
based priming has recently been shown to influence recollection
estimates even in the context of binary R/K judgments (Taylor
and Henson, 2012; Taylor et al., 2013). It is possible that the
direct repetition of a meaningful verbal stimulus in the Jacoby
andWhitehouse paradigm also induces fluency effects at the level
of conceptual processing. To the extent that, in the present study,
we observed the effect with novel faces that could not have been
encountered prior to the experiment, and that would have no
direct meaning attached, we arguably reduced any potential influ-
ence of conceptual fluency. This interpretation is in line with ERP
research showing that familiarity for faces previously encountered
only in the experimental context (i.e., without pre-existing mean-
ing) has an electrophysiological signature that is distinct from the
one typically observed in association with conceptual priming
or conceptually-based familiarity for verbal stimuli (MacKenzie
and Donaldson, 2007; Voss et al., 2012). An interesting question
that deserves further direct investigation is whether perceptual
fluency is indeed more selective in its effect on familiarity-based
recognition memory than conceptual fluency.
POSITIVE AFFECT AND ENHANCED FACE FAMILIARITY
In Experiment 2 we reasoned that if the impact of fluency in the
Jacoby–Whitehouse paradigm is closely tied to feelings of positive
affect, then primes with happy facial expression should also lead
to an increase in the perceived familiarity of subsequently pre-
sented memory probes. Faces with happy as compared to neutral
expressions did indeed lead to a liberal shift in familiarity-based
response bias, even though the primes were always of a differ-
ent identity than the subsequently presented memory probes.
A particularly noteworthy aspect of these results is that the
mnemonic effects of positive affective priming, which have pre-
viously been reported for memory decisions on verbal stimuli
(Garcia-Marques et al., 2004; Phaf and Rotteveele, 2005), extend
to arguably the most relevant social stimulus class—human faces.
From an evolutionary perspective, positive affect may serve an
adaptive purpose in leading people to construe familiar others
as safe, and promote social interaction (Goodman and Leyden,
1991). It is in line with the notion that positive affect may sig-
nify safe, non-threatening situations more broadly (Zajonc, 2001;
Song and Schwarz, 2009). Interestingly, in past studies it has
also been demonstrated that the perceived happiness of faces
with ostensibly neutral expression is positively correlated with
the perceived trustworthiness of those faces (Winston et al., 2002;
Todorov and Duchaine, 2008). In future studies, it will be impor-
tant to determine whether priming of recognition decisions with
negative facial expressions, such as fear or anger, produces effects
that differ from those induced by positive affect. Given that,
the presentation of fearful faces has been shown to enhance
the accuracy of subsequent visual perceptual judgments (Phelps
et al., 2006), it is possible that such primes would also improve
familiarity-based memory discrimination. Fear may engender a
state of sensory hyper-vigilance (Whalen, 1998; Susskind et al.,
2008) that actually boosts memory accuracy, rather than induce a
shift in response bias.
That we observed a liberal shift in response bias for familiarity-
based decisions with a manipulation of positive affect that was
independent of the memoranda themselves (i.e., that impacted
recognition decisions for neutral faces), is evidence that clearly
speaks in favor of an attributional account of the present results.
As noted by Verde et al. (2010), interpreting similar effects when
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the recognition probes themselves evoke positive affect is not
straightforward. Indeed, these authors showed that, when the
stimulus content is the source of affect, an increase in false alarms
for positive stimuli may not reflect a shift in response criterion,
but rather a drop in memory accuracy due to higher semantic
overlap between these stimuli.
FAMILIARITY AND PRIME AWARENESS
In both present experiments, effects of priming on familiarity-
based memory decisions were observed only in those participants
who were unaware of the priming manipulation, as reflected
in their performance in our separate prime-discrimination task.
Additional correlational analyses also revealed a negative asso-
ciation between the shift in response bias produced by priming
and prime-discrimination performance when we examined the
entire sample of participants in each experiment. Across par-
ticipants, lower levels of prime discriminability were associated
with an increase in the difference between response criterion for
familiarity-based responses for theMatch vs. Scramble conditions
in Experiment 1, and for happy vs. neutral primes in Experiment
2. The difference in response bias for familiarity-based “Know”
responses was such that Match primes and Happy primes were
associated with a significantly more liberal response bias than
their respective control conditions. That the effectiveness of our
experimental manipulation critically depended on lack of prime
awareness can be seen as additional support for the notion that
familiarity relies, at least in part, on an attribution process that
is based on fluency and positive affect. This idea was part of
the original account of the Jacoby and Whitehouse effect offered
by the authors (Jacoby and Whitehouse, 1989), and was subse-
quently developed into the Discrepancy Attribution Hypothesis
by Whittlesea and Williams (2000, 2001a,b). The latter hypothe-
sis is based on the notion that the critical determinant of such an
attribution process is not the absolute level of experienced fluency
but the deviation from related expectations; misattributions are
most likely to occur when the level of experienced fluency deviates
from some expected standard or norm (Whittlesea and Williams,
2001b). From this perspective, the present findings could suggest
that the fluency afforded by priming was experienced as surpris-
ing or unexpected only in participants who were unaware of the
primes, and who attributed it to prior exposure with the test item
due to this discrepancy. For those participants who did demon-
strate some awareness of the critical prime stimuli, by contrast,
any related increase in fluency may not have been experienced
as surprising, given that it could be attributed to exposure to the
primes. Inasmuch as the same pattern of results emerged for both
primingmanipulations, our findings suggest that familiarity attri-
butions of positive affect and fluency are governed by the same set
of principles, and that unexpected positive affect is attributed to
prior experience, even in the absence of a corresponding change
in perceptual fluency. As such our findings also provide support
for theoretical accounts that identify experienced positive affect as
the proximal cue that signals fluency in familiarity-based recog-
nition memory decisions, and in other intuitive judgments (e.g.,
Reber et al., 1998; Harmon-Jones and Allen, 2001; Monin, 2003;
Topolinski and Strack, 2009).
Although the priming-related shift in response bias was criti-
cally dependent on participants’ awareness of the primes in the
present experiments, it is important to note that attributions
based on manipulations of fluency do not always require that
participants be unaware of the source of this fluency. For exam-
ple, some studies (Phaf and Rotteveele, 2005; Topolinski and
Strack, 2009) have shown that affect-related fluency manipula-
tions (i.e., instructed contraction of zygomatic muscle) of which
participants are presumably aware when they follow instructions
can also lead to attributional effects similar to those obtained
here. Perhaps the key determinant of these effects is not whether
participants are aware of the source of fluency itself (i.e., mus-
cle tension), but rather any subjectively perceived or inferred
relationship between the fluency manipulation and the task judg-
ments; participants who do not perceive any such relationship
would be more likely to use fluency as a cue to inform their judg-
ments. In this context it is worth noting that experiments with
affect-related fluency manipulations typically introduce explicit
deception so as to hide any potential link whereas in the cur-
rent experiments this was not necessary. From this perspective,
despite the supraliminal nature of some fluency manipulations,
the pattern of attributional effects may still be the same and
could still be accommodated within the Discrepancy-Attribution
framework.
CONCLUSIONS
In the current experiments, we demonstrated that perceptual
fluency and positive affect influence recognition memory in a
highly similar and specific manner that can well be understood
in the context of dual-process models of recognition memory.
Although our results support an attributional account of familiar-
ity, we hasten to add that they do not imply that familiarity must
always be a product of attribution. Instead, we would argue that
familiarity can result from multiple underlying sources, includ-
ing direct access to pertinent stored memory traces, as modeled
in many computational accounts of familiarity assessment (see
Clark and Gronlund, 1996, for review), and as assumed in much
current cognitive neuroscience research (see Norman, 2010, see
Skinner and Fernandes, 2007, for review). An important goal for
future research is to shed light on the interplay between attribu-
tional mechanisms and direct access to stored representations in
familiarity-based memory judgments.
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